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Abstract 
In electricity day-ahead markets organized as uniform price auction, a small reduction 
in supply in times of high demand can cause substantial increases in price. We use a 
unique data set of failures of generation capacity in the German-Austrian electricity 
market to investigate the relationship between electricity spot prices and generation 
failures. Differentiating between strategic and non-strategic failures, we find a positive 
impact of prices on non-usable marginal generation capacity for strategic failures only. 
Our empirical analysis therefore provides evidence for the existence of strategic 
capacity withholding through failures suggesting further monitoring efforts by public 
authorities to effectively reduce the likelihood of such abuses of a dominant position.    
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1 Introduction 
Strategic behavior – defined as set of actions a firm takes to influence the market 
environment so as to increase its profits1 – is a common occurrence in markets with a 
rather small number of firms being able to observe each other’s actions. Although 
strategic behavior is generally expected to lead to prices above marginal costs, only 
certain forms are considered likely to lead to clear net welfare losses and are thus 
banned by existing competition laws. Examples include various forms of abuses of a 
dominant position such as predation, certain rebate schemes or raising rival’s costs 
strategies.  
 Since the deregulation of significant parts of electricity markets in many countries 
around the world, operators have been quite innovative in applying various forms of 
strategic behavior aiming at increasing profits, however, with potentially negative net 
effects on overall welfare (see generally Stoft, 2002). An intensively discussed form of 
such strategic behavior is ‘capacity withholding’ which makes use of the fact that the 
supply schedule typically is convex while demand is unresponsive to price signals in the 
short-term. Hence, whenever demand is high, a small reduction in supply substantially 
increases the marginal price and – because electricity markets are generally organized 
as uniform price auctions – the price all operators receive. By strategically removing a 
fraction of their operating capacity from the market (e.g., by pretending a sudden failure 
of a generation unit), multi-unit plant operators expect that the correspondingly higher 
prices realized for the remaining operating units offset the lost revenues from the 
(strategically) removed capacity and thus lead to a net increase in profits. 
 In this context, we use a unique data set of failures of generation capacity in the 
German-Austrian electricity market to investigate the relationship between electricity 
spot prices and generation failures. Differentiating between strategic and non-strategic 
failures, we find a positive impact of prices on non-usable generation capacity for 
strategic failures of hard coal as well as (partly) gas-fueled plants only. Our empirical 
results are therefore consistent with existing theoretical research which has identified 
market price manipulations through (mocked) failures – so called physical capacity 
withholding – as potentially rational behavior of multi-unit plant operators in electricity 
markets. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest (further) monitoring efforts by 
public authorities to effectively reduce the likelihood of such abuses of market power. 
                                                            
1  Carlton and Perloff (2000), pp. 332f. 
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 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following second section 
introduces into the theoretical concept of strategic capacity withholding and reviews 
empirical evidence from different national electricity markets. The subsequent third 
section begins with a general characterization for the German-Austrian electricity 
market in Section 3.1 followed by a more specific discussion on the relevance of 
strategic capacity withholding in this particular market as part of Section 3.2. Our 
empirical analysis of a possible relationship between electricity prices and generation 
failures is presented in the fourth section. While Section 4.1 describes the construction 
of the data set and discusses the descriptive statistics, Section 4.2 develops our 
empirical strategy and presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 Strategic Capacity Withholding – Theoretical Concept and Empirical Evidence 
We first provide an introduction of the theoretical concept of strategic capacity 
withholding in Section 2.1, followed by a brief review of existing empirical research on 
this form of strategic behavior in Section 2.2. 
2.1 Theoretical Concept 
The possibility and profitability of strategic behavior is closely tied to certain market- 
and firm-related preconditions. From a market perspective, the success of strategic 
behavior crucially depends on how well a certain strategy is taking advantage of, first, 
general demand- and supply characteristics and, second, the implemented market design 
(including a possible regulatory oversight). From a firm perspective, a certain degree of 
market power is usually needed to be able to successfully apply strategic moves. 
 Electricity as product generally has many characteristics which make an application 
of various forms of strategic behavior likely. From a market perspective, a lack of real-
time pricing and demand side participation leads to inelastic short-term demand for both 
industrial and residential consumers. From a firm perspective, especially generation 
markets are often characterized by the presence of few but large multi-unit plant 
operators which are generally able to successfully implement strategic moves. 
Typically, their respective generation systems consist of several types of units with 
some being characterized by low marginal costs but low flexibility (e.g., renewables, 
nuclear or lignite plants) and some by high marginal costs but higher flexibility in use 
(e.g., hard coal or gas-fueled plants). While the former are typically covering the base 
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load, i.e., minimum demand, the latter are activated gradually to the degree rising 
demand makes this necessary.  Therefore, the supply curve is typically convex. 
 The design of many (wholesale) electricity markets allows producers two main 
possibilities to trade their product: ‘long- and medium-term’ or ‘short-term’. The 
typically largest part of expected demand is traded via long- and medium-term contracts 
‘over-the-counter’ from several years to months prior to supply. Short-term contracts 
come into play when actual demand can be estimated more precisely. These contracts 
are then typically traded at a power exchange, the so-called spot market for electricity. 
Subdivided further into the day-ahead market and intraday trading, the former aims at 
optimizing liquidity in the market while the latter ensures the possibility to react to 
specific incidences closer to real-time.  
 Focusing on ‘short-term’ day-ahead markets in the remainder of this section, the 
majority of these markets are organized as uniform-price auction or last-price auction 
(see Newbery, 1995), i.e., market participants submit their bids and asks and the 
operating counterparty sets a clearing price that all participants receive or pay, 
respectively. This market design implies that buyers who bid more than the clearing 
price have to pay less than they actually would. By the same logic, suppliers that offered 
their output for less than the clearing price experience a profit2 (see Cramton and Stoft, 
2007).  
 As uniform price auctions are established at most power exchanges all over the 
world3, there is a large amount of academic literature analyzing electricity markets with 
uniform-price auctions4 in general and ‘suspicious’ developments such as unexpected 
temporary price rises in particular (see, e.g., Kwoka and Sabodash, 2011). These 
developments raised concerns about the abuse of market power – first and foremost 
                                                            
2  As a consequence, in an electricity market environment, operators of power plants fueled with low-
cost resources experience profits (stimulating further investments in these types of production 
technologies; see Cramton and Stoft, 2007). 
3  The UK is the most prominent exemption where the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) 
in 2001 introduced the pay-as-bid auction as allocation mechanism. A key driver for this market 
design reform in England and Wales was the belief of the British regulatory authority in charge, 
OFGEM, that uniform auctions are more subject to strategic manipulation by large traders than pay-
as-bid auctions (see, e.g., Evans and Green, 2003). From an academic perspective, on the surface, 
such a market design would indeed eliminate the profitability of strategic capacity withholding as 
power plants do not profit from a spontaneous unavailability of another power plant. However, as 
shown by Kahn et al. (2001) or Heim and Götz (2013), withholding strategies are also possible in pay-
as-bid auctions under certain market conditions.  
4  Another reason is that uniform price auctions offer advantageous properties for algebraic analysis 
compared to pay-as-bid auctions. 
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with respect to forms of collusive behavior but also with respect to applications of 
particular unilateral strategies including abusive capacity withholding.  
 Generally, the capacity withholding strategy makes use of the particular 
characteristics of electricity markets in general and uniform-price auctions in particular. 
Given the inelastic demand and applying uniform-price auctions, all operators receive 
the same price (per unit of output) which is determined by the costs of the marginal 
plant that is just needed to satisfy demand. In such an environment a small reduction in 
supply causes large price increases whenever demand intersect with the supply curve at 
a sufficiently steep part. By strategically removing a fraction of their operating capacity 
from the market, operators expect that the correspondingly higher prices realized for the 
remaining operating units offset the lost revenues from the (strategically) removed 
capacity. Eventually, capacity withholding is expected to lead to higher profits for the 
multi-unit plant operators at the expense of a reduced consumer surplus. Although the 
deadweight loss is expected to be small or even non-existent due to the low demand 
elasticity, efficiency losses are nevertheless created by a suboptimal use of the existing 
generation systems with baseload units being replaced (for strategic reasons) by a less 
efficient marginal technology.  
 Although the idea behind a capacity withholding strategy is straightforward, its 
successful practical implementation is tied to certain conditions. First, capacity 
withholding by definition demands a multi-unit operator as only the existence of 
multiple units provides the possibility that the (additional) revenues generated by the 
still operating units surpasses the lost revenue from the withheld units. Second, in 
addition to multiple units, a certain market share (or market power, respectively) is 
sometimes mentioned as additional precondition for a successful application of capacity 
withholding strategies. However, although there are no serious doubts that the 
attractiveness of such a strategy increases with the number and size of plants of a certain 
operator – leading to a decrease in the minimal price that is needed to profitably apply a 
withholding strategy – the general method can also be successfully applied by smaller 
multi-unit plant operators units without a significant overall market share (see, e.g. 
Cabral, 2002, Dechenaux and Kovenock, 2007, Kwoka and Sabodash, 2011, or 
Fogelberg and Lazarczyk, 2014).  
 Turning from the general concept to the implementation of the capacity withholding 
strategy, the academic literature distinguishes between ‘economic withholding’ and 
‘physical withholding’ (see Joskow and Kahn, 2002). Economic withholding – also 
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known as hockey stick bidding – refers to a strategy where a supplier offers part of its 
capacity at an extremely high price thus moving it to the very right of the supply curve. 
Consequently, a part of the overall supply curve would shift to the left causing the 
desired price increase of a capacity withholding strategy. Although theoretically sound 
and workable, economic withholding faces the key challenge that it is relatively easy to 
detect by market surveillance authorities, e.g., by comparing the respective bid curves 
of a suspicious operator either over time or between different operators (see Heim and 
Götz, 2013). 
 Due to these challenges in hiding economic capacity withholding strategies from 
public authorities, the recent literature concentrates on physical capacity withholding 
strategies as part of which the respective capacity is completely taken out of the market 
and thus achieve the desired shift of the supply curve to the left. Generally, there exist 
different reasons why capacities are temporarily non-usable (see Joskow and Kahn, 
2002). While scheduled non-usabilities, i.e., outages that are announced well in 
advance, are likely to reflect regular maintenance activities, unscheduled non-usabilities 
reported shortly before or after the beginning of the outage rather refer to acute failures 
of the respective units. Because information on the market situation increases as the 
time of generation approaches – which is crucial for profitable execution of withholding 
strategies – particularly unscheduled non-usabilities through pretended acute failures 
appear to be a suitable capacity withholding strategy. In our empirical analysis below 
we will therefore differentiate between the possible impact of electricity prices on non-
usable generation capacity from failures with and without the potential to successfully 
apply strategic capacity withholding. 
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
In the following, we review several seminal empirical papers on the issue of capacity 
withholding in the national electricity markets of England and Wales, the United States 
and Sweden. Studying strategic behavior in the electricity market in England and Wales, 
Wolfram (1998) finds indications for strategic bidding when prices are high. In 
particular, she provides evidence consistent with the presence of economic capacity 
withholding through high bids for marginal units. Wolfram further shows that bigger 
suppliers were more active in applying such strategies indicating that a large market 
share facilitates strategic capacity withholding. Wolak and Patrick (2001) also 
investigate the electricity market of England and Wales. They argue that, given the 
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market framework at the time, the two major market suppliers can increase their profits 
by choosing which part of their capacity they declare as available. Although partly 
dependent on factors not completely under their control, Wolak and Patrick (2001) find 
evidence for the (temporary) existence of strategic capacity withholding behavior.  
 Turning to empirical evidence from the United States, Joskow and Kahn (2002) 
analyze the 2001 California electricity crisis and specifically investigate whether forced 
outages contributed to the dramatic prices increase experienced at the peak of the crisis. 
The authors find evidence for “a substantial gap between maximum possible levels of 
generation and observed levels in those hours identified as economical for all in-state 
generation” (Joskow and Kahn, 2002, p. 29). Although the data used for the analysis 
does not allow a deeper analysis of potential withholding behavior, they conclude that 
“there is sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that the observed prices reflect 
suppliers exercising market power” (Joskow and Kahn, 2002, p. 29).  
 In their empirical analysis of the New York wholesale electricity market, Kwoka and 
Sabodash (2011) aim at investigating whether identified temporary and unexpected rises 
in the price – so-called price spikes – can be seen as an indication for strategic capacity 
withholding activities. Focusing on possible differences in quantities offered in the 
market, they argue that any evidence indicating that suppliers offer less electricity when 
peak prices are forecasted than under ordinary conditions would represent “a divergence 
from normal profit-maximizing business behavior” (Kwoka and Sabodash, 2011, p. 
298). They find clear evidence of such behavior for the largest bidders in the market 
who seem to have conducted both physical capacity withholding and some kind of 
economic capacity withholding aiming at increasing the market price. While all these 
studies analyze withholding strategies in uniform-price auctions, Heim and Götz (2013) 
also find evidence for an application of such strategies in pay-as-bid auctions (for the 
case of the German market for reserve capacity). 
 Last but not least, Fogelberg and Lazarczyk (2014) investigate strategic capacity 
withholding in the Swedish day-ahead market. Using a data set of all power plant 
outages (exceeding a certain dimension), they aim at analyzing whether price 
developments have an influence on failures of generating units which could be seen as 
evidence for the existence of strategic capacity withholding. Furthermore, the authors 
expect that, first, in accordance with the theoretical considerations above, marginal units 
rather than baseload units are predominantly abused to exercise such capacity 
withholding strategies. Second, Fogelberg and Lazarczyk (2014) identify a different 
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type of capacity withholding that refers to the delayed restart of units after a shut-down. 
In particular, an operator could for example delay the restart of a power plant when 
prices are high because it expects the price to significantly decrease once the power 
plant is back in production.  
 Given these hypotheses and applying a detailed data set on failures in the Swedish 
market, Fogelberg and Lazarczyk (2014) find a significant positive relationship for all 
fuel types and for the market’s marginal units. A split of reports in new failures and 
follow-up failures shows that the effect is slightly larger for follow-up failures 
providing evidence for both the theory about failures in general and the role of follow-
up failures in particular. As part of our empirical analysis below, we will investigate 
whether comparable empirical evidence on capacity withholding can be found for the 
German-Austrian electricity market.  
3 The German-Austrian Electricity Market and the Relevance of Strategic 
Capacity Withholding  
Important preconditions for a meaningful empirical investigation of the role of strategic 
capacity withholding is, first, a deeper understanding of the design of the German-
Austrian electricity market in general (Section 3.1) and, second, an overview of prior 
discussions on the relevance of strategic capacity withholding in this market in 
particular (Section 3.2).  
3.1 The German-Austrian Electricity Market 
According to 2013 Eurostat data5, the fully integrated German-Austrian electricity 
market6 accounts to roughly 21 percent of total final energy consumption in the 
European Union. With about 581 TWh of consumed electricity, the market was 
substantially larger than the national markets in the runner-up countries France (439 
TWh), the UK (317 TWh), Italy (287 TWh) and Spain (232 TWh).   
 Generally, the German-Austrian electricity market is characterized by the same well-
known demand- and supply-side specificities of electricity markets already sketched in 
Section 2.1 above. On the demand side, residential or industrial demand for electricity is 
                                                            
5  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Electricity_production,_consumption_ and_ 
market_overview/de (last accessed on 8 January 2016) 
6  Although different nations, the electricity markets of Germany and Austria are fully integrated 
showing “… no bottlenecks at cross-border interconnectors … and the two countries comprise a 
single market and price territory on EPEX” (German Federal Cartel Office, 2011, p. 6). 
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highly price-inelastic – despite recent increases in demand management appliances – 
and fluctuates over the day with the peak period defined from 8am to 8pm (and a 
reduced demand over the weekends). Average prices in the winter are higher than in the 
summer mainly due to the use of heating facilities (and the limited role of air 
conditioning in the summer).  
 On the supply-side, Figure 1 below shows the merit order for the German-Austrian 
market in 2013. It begins on the left-hand side with a significant (and further increasing) 
share of ‘must-take’ renewables followed by nuclear, lignite and (newer) hard coal 
power plants.7 In 2013, these technologies together were sufficient to cover the average 
demand for electricity in Germany and Austria. Peak demand coverage, however, 
demanded the additional operation of more inefficient (older) hard coal plants as well as 
(more flexible) gas- or even oil-fueled plants located at the right of the merit order due 
to their higher marginal costs of production.  
 
Figure 1: Merit Order in the German-Austrian Electricity Market in 2013 
Note: Constructed from technical data using fuel costs and efficiency factors of each power plant in the 
German-Austrian electricity market 
 
Although a large fraction of electricity in the German-Austrian electricity market is 
allocated ‘over-the-counter’ via long-term contracts, roughly one third of the overall 
                                                            
7  Due to promotional schemes, renewables benefit from unlimited priority feed-in into the grid 
regardless of demand. 
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demand is traded on the day-ahead spot market called EPEX SPOT8 which handles the 
spot markets for Austria, Germany, Switzerland and France. EPEX SPOT basically 
offers market platforms for the day-ahead auctions and continuous intraday trading. 
These different markets offered by EPEX SPOT should be interpreted as complements 
rather than substitutes as the day-ahead market is thought to optimize liquidity in the 
market while the intraday trading ensures the possibility to react to specific incidences 
closer to real-time. Even though up-to-date information on the profitability of 
withholding strategies will be available in the intraday market, there are at least two 
reasons which make an application of withholding strategies in this market unlikely: 
first, as the intraday market works via bilateral trading instead of being organized as 
auction there is no single clearing price (which prevents the profitability of withholding 
capacity) and second, the market only has the task to smooth short-term deviations 
between supply and demand and therefore only a small amount of capacity is traded 
intraday (limiting the profitable execution of withholding strategies). Thus, as only the 
day-ahead market provides an environment potentially suitable for strategic capacity 
withholding, we limit our further discussion and analysis to this particular market.    
 In uniform price auctions, all successful bidders receive the same price per unit of 
output which is determined by the price of the marginal plant that is just needed to 
satisfy demand. Bids basically contain the amount of power demanded or supplied for a 
certain timeframe and the corresponding willingness to pay. This timeframe can either 
be an individual hour or a block of hours on the next day. Having the merit order 
concept in mind, it appears obvious that a power plant with lower marginal cost would 
bid a lower price for its generated electricity with the aggregated supply curve 
eventually reflecting the merit order of the market. In the German-Austrian market, the 
bids have to be submitted until 12 pm on the day before. The system then aggregates the 
orders to demand and supply functions. The intersection of the resulting curves finally 
determines the traded quantity and the market price.  
 As part of their market surveillance activities, EEX collects and publishes – via its 
transparency platform9 – detailed information on both scheduled and unscheduled non-
usabilities of all reported power generation generating units of 100 MW or more lasting 
                                                            
8  EPEX SPOT has been created after the merger of Powernext SA in France and the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) AG in Germany. Under the new EPEX organization, EEX provides both general 
market data and further up-to-date market information regarding the EPEX SPOT market.  
9  http://www.eex-transparency.com/homepage/power/germany/production/availability/non-usability 
(last accessed on 8 January 2016). 
 10 
 
for a minimum time of one hour. The information provided by the platform will be of 
key relevance for our empirical analysis in Section 4 below.  
3.2 The Relevance of Strategic Capacity Withholding  
The uniform price auction applied at the EPEX (formerly EEX) power exchange 
generally provides the opportunity for capacity withholding strategies and their actual 
implementation10 – by a dominant multi-unit plant operator – would constitute an abuse 
of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and of Section 19 (1) of the German Act 
against Restraints of Competition (ARC). Already in 2002, the European Commission 
initiated abuse proceedings against the four large energy providers in Germany (E.ON, 
RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall) accusing them of price manipulations at the EEX in 
general and capacity withholding in particular. Although all proceedings were 
eventually closed without deciding on the question whether capacity withholding 
strategies were actually applied, in the case of E.ON, the Commission (in November 
200811) reached a concession agreement that forced the energy provider to the sale of 
5.000 MW of generation capacity (and their supergrid) aiming at reducing its market 
power.12  
 Parallel to (and after) the investigation by the European Commission, the topic 
gained in importance in Germany, e.g., reflected in political initiatives (particularly by 
the Green Party demanding additional market monitoring activities), newspaper articles 
(see, e.g., Schumann, 2009, or Dämon, 2011), articles published in German law journals 
(see, e.g., Becker, 2008, Jahn, 2008, and Jungbluth and Borchert, 2008), commissioned 
reports on the role of market power in German electricity wholesale markets in general 
and the role of capacity withholding in particular (see, e.g., Swider et al., 2007, von 
Hirschhausen et al., 2007, or Fouquet et al., 2011) as well as several purely academic 
studies (see, e.g., Müsgens, 2006, or Schwarz and Lang, 2006).   
 While the German Federal Cartel Office refrained from investigating the presence of 
capacity withholding strategies in parallel to the European Commission, the authority 
                                                            
10  As the large electricity providers in Germany are prohibited by law to set prices above marginal costs, 
the incentive to apply strategic capacity withholding strategies – as generator of additional revenue – 
is increased further.  
11  COMP/39.388 Deutscher Stromgroßhandelsmarkt and COMP/39.389 Deutscher Regelenergiemarkt. 
12  The proceedings against the other three large energy providers were closed in October 2009 without 
the imposition of any concessions. For RWE and Vattenfall, no sufficient evidence on capacity 
withholding activities were found and in case of EnBW the absence of a dominant position in the 
market already foreclosed the imposition of any concessions or fines.  
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later considered the existing evidence as insufficient to initiate formal abuse 
proceedings. However, it decided to investigate the issue as part of a broader sector 
inquiry into electricity generation and wholesale markets whose results were published 
in January 2011 (see German Federal Cartel Office, 2011, for an English summary). 
Interestingly, mainly concentrating on physical capacity withholding13, the authority 
collected detailed data from the respective power plant operational managements of the 
four large energy providers in Germany aiming at determining (retrospectively) the 
optimal operation of each individual electricity generating unit.14 After cleaning the data 
for non-usabilities caused by reasons other than (potential) capacity withholding15, the 
respective optimized operation values were compared to the actual operation of each 
unit thereby establishing the extent to which the units were not operating (although they 
should have in a competitive environment).   
 Although the application of the algorithm was eventually able to identify a limited 
amount of unutilized capacity, the authority concluded that “… the non-operation of 
profitable power plants identified in the present inquiry is too limited to initiate specific 
abuse proceedings with respect to the period examined” (Federal Cartel Office (2011), 
p. 13). In particular, the following alternative explanations for the observed amount of 
unutilized capacity were mentioned: (1) intraday market trading activities, (2) the 
general uncertainty operators face when optimizing generation capacity (which cannot 
be taken into account as part of the retrospective assessment done by the authority), (3) 
the development of more complex bidding strategies, and (4) remaining technical 
restrictions (beyond the ones already excluded in the beginning of the analysis). In sum, 
the impossibility to differentiate clearly between (anti-competitive) capacity 
withholding behavior and other types of (pro-competitive) behavior in the observed 
market conduct foreclosed the initiation of abuse proceedings against the large energy 
providers (see also Swider et al. (2007) for a general discussion of the challenges of 
empirically identifying capacity withholding strategies in real markets). 
                                                            
13  The Federal Cartel Office assumes an abuse of market power by physical capacity withholding “… 
where an undertaking in a dominant position, without any objective reason, does not offer electricity 
from capacities actually available which could be sold at a price at or above its respective short-term 
marginal costs” (Federal Cartel Office (2011), p. 10). 
14  The optimization criterion here is the contribution margin of each individual electricity generating unit 
over a period of one year.  
15  In particular, the Federal Cartel Office included technical limitations, such as routine maintenance or 
unplanned power plant blackouts, minimum operational and minimum standstill times, grid 
restrictions and the provision of control and reserve capacity. 
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 Despite the fact that the suspicions of strategic capacity withholding have so far not 
led to a conviction as part of formal abuse proceedings on either the European or the 
national level, the intensive discussions in both academia and practice on the relevance 
of market power abuses in energy markets certainly contributed to the creation of a 
general European legal framework for monitoring wholesale energy markets in order to 
prevent insider trading and market manipulation – the so-called REMIT Regulation – 
and its specific implementation in Germany through the passing of the ‘Act on the 
creation of a market transparency body for electricity and gas wholesale trading’. The 
act provides the legal basis for a more extensive monitoring of wholesale electricity and 
gas markets by the so-called ‘market transparency unit for wholesale electricity and gas 
markets’16 which is jointly run by the competition authority – the German Federal 
Cartel Office – and the regulatory authority – the German Federal Network Agency. 
Complementary, as already described in the previous sub-section, the EEX introduced a 
transparency platform – according to the REMIT standards – easing the monitoring of 
the respective markets and additionally providing the possibility to conduct empirical 
research on the issue of strategic capacity withholding through failures described in the 
following section.   
4 Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we empirically analyze the relationship between electricity prices and 
generation failures. While Section 4.1 describes the construction of the data set and 
discusses the descriptive statistics, Section 4.2 continues with the development of our 
empirical strategy – including the choice of instruments and the choice of control 
variables – and the presentation of our empirical results.  
4.1 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
The data set used in this article was constructed by merging data of different types and 
sources. Given our research question of a possible impact of electricity prices on 
generation non-usabilities, our main variables characterized in the following are failures 
of generating units and electricity prices (Section 4.1.1) followed by our control 
variables (Section 4.1.2). The descriptive statistics of our data set are presented and 
discussed in Section 4.1.3. 
                                                            
16  More detailed information on the market transparency unit for wholesale electricity and gas markets 
can be found at http://www.markttransparenzstelle.de/cln_1432/EN/Home/start.html (last accessed on 
8 January 2016).  
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4.1.1 Main Variables 
Failures 
Failures (i.e., non-usabilities) of generating units in the German-Austrian electricity 
market represent our outcome variables and were constructed by conducting several 
subsequent steps. First, we accessed the EEX Transparency Platform17 which provides 
detailed information on both scheduled and unscheduled non-usabilities of all reported 
power generation units of 100 MW or more lasting for a minimum time of one hour.18 
The platform includes information on type (scheduled or unscheduled), company, 
facility, unit, fuel, control area, begin and expected end, limitation (MW), reason 
(outage or other), status as well as updates on the respective non-usability event, e.g. 
whether the length of the non-usability was actually shorter or longer than initially 
reported. 
 Second, we restricted our raw data set to all non-usability events in the period from 1 
January 2013 to 31 March 2014. While the beginning of our observation period was 
determined by the fact that the data in its current form is only available from December 
2012 onwards, the end of the observation period was necessary due to additional 
reporting requirements for several companies that were demanded from spring 2014 
onwards (which led to a reduced availability of the data needed for our analysis).  
 Third, the fact that every update on a certain non-usability event enters the platform 
as new event required a substantial adjustment process of the raw data to arrive at a data 
set with one single entry for each non-usability. In fact, we made use of this situation 
and created two sub-data sets: a first one presenting the information related to the first 
announcement of a certain non-usability and a second one with the information related 
to the last update for a particular case.19 
 Based on this initial data set we construct two measures of failures as outcome 
variables: Non-strategic failures and strategic failures. Failures classified as non-
strategic contain all failures we do not expect to possess any strategic potential in terms 
of successfully implementing a profitable capacity withholding strategy. Profitable 
withholding strategies require a) ex-ante knowledge of sudden price spikes and b) 
                                                            
17  http://www.eex-transparency.com/homepage/power/germany/production/availability/non-usability 
(last accessed on 8 January 2016). 
18  Limitations of at least 10 MW lasting for 15 minutes or more can be reported on a voluntary basis. 
19  The comparison of the first announcements with the last updates is similar to the strategy of splitting 
failure reports into new reports and follow-up reports as implemented in Fogelberg and Lazarczyk 
(2014). 
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entering the market again as close as possible after the price spike. Therefore, we chose 
a definition where such non-strategic failures are planned and announced with a 
sufficiently long lead-time prior to the outage. At that point in time, we assume market 
information will still be too imprecise to apply strategic withholding, especially due to 
the large share of generation from fluctuating renewable energy sources. Furthermore, 
as price spikes mostly occur for a few hours only, it is reasonable to believe that outages 
that last longer than one day are most likely not subject to strategic capacity 
withholding. In sum, all failures are defined as non-strategic which last less than one 
day and are announced more than one week before the actual outage. As a plant 
operator can adjust the duration of a failure thereby introducing a further strategic 
component (e.g., through extending or shortening the failure duration conditioned on 
the price level at the time of the failure), we use the initially reported length of the 
failure at the time of the announcement rather than its actual length.  
 In contrast, our strategic failures variable contains all failures with characteristics 
that might enable withholding strategies. Such failures must be spontaneous reactions to 
certain market situations in which withholding only a small fraction of capacity is likely 
to cause a substantial price increase. Furthermore, such spontaneous outages must not 
last particularly long as a withholding strategy is typically only a profitable strategy for 
a few hours (due to rapidly changing load patterns). As a consequence, we only define 
failures as strategic if they are unannounced, i.e., they were reported after the beginning 
of the actual event, and last only one day or less. However, in contrast to the procedure 
implemented for non-strategic failures, we now measure the length of a failure by the 
actual rather than the initially reported length in order to take account of the possible 
incentives of operators to condition the length of the outage on current price levels.  
 Generally, we compute both strategic and non-strategic failure variables for all 
relevant fuel types. The application of the separate steps just characterized results in our 
failure data set ready to be used in the empirical analysis. Although the data set includes 
information on both the number of non-usable units and the number of non-usable 
megawatts, we will use the latter as part of our analysis – basically because the size of 
the respective shifts in the supply curve depend on the changes in capacity rather than 
the number of generating units.  
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Electricity Prices 
The predictor variable of interest for our research question is the electricity price. For 
the (fully integrated) German-Austrian market, electricity price data are obtained from 
the EPEX server. We use the EPEX base price – a spot price index provided by EPEX 
which is computed as the unweighted average of hourly prices. We are aware of 
potential endogeneity issues as regards our key variable. An obvious reason is reverse 
causality as the demand curve intersects the merit order further to the right whenever a 
power plant would be “in merit” but is not available. This in turn increases the marginal 
price. In fact, this is nothing else than the actual motivation for multi-unit plant 
operators to withhold capacity. If this would not be the case, an application of strategic 
withholding strategies would no longer be possible. We therefore have to instrument for 
the electricity price by using the TTF Gas Price, ARA Coal Price and the ETS Carbon 
Price (all three obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream). As hard coal and gas are 
input resources for electricity generation and the carbon emission price also causes cost 
shifts, rising prices in these variables are expected to cause rising electricity prices. 
Prices for hard coal, gas and carbon are assumed to be exogenous, given that the prices 
for these inputs are determined on a supra-national basis rather than being set 
domestically within Germany. Hard coal and gas are traded on the world market and 
carbon within the EU ETS which covers all 28 EU states plus Norway, Liechtenstein 
and Iceland. At the same time, there is no apparent reason to believe that these prices 
have any direct influence on power plant non-usabilities.  
4.1.2 Control Variables 
Complementary to our failure type outcome variables and the variable of interest – price 
– we include several control variables described in the next paragraphs. 
System Load 
Data for the system load are obtained from the ENTSO-E transparency site. Our load 
variable is computed as the sum of the daily average loads in Germany and Austria. As 
system load determines the power plants required to meet demand, i.e., the intersection 
of the demand and supply curve, one could initially consider it a candidate to instrument 
for electricity price if a perfectly inelastic demand is assumed in the short-term. 
However, there is also a potential relation between system load and failures: when 
demand is high, multi-unit plant operators have incentives to run their generating units 
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at maximum capacity but a high demand also requires a higher flexibility (so-called 
cycling). Both make outages more likely. Thus, the level of load might have 
explanatory power for failures and, at the same time, is also related to the electricity 
price. However, since we instrument for price and are not particularly interested in the 
coefficient of load, we simply include the load variable into our model on the right-hand 
side.20 
Temperature and Level of German Rivers 
As many (conventional) German power plants take their necessary cooling water out of 
rivers, high river temperatures (above 23° Celsius) and low river levels might force 
them to reduce or even shut-down their electricity generation making price increases 
likely (see, e.g., McDermott and Nilsen (2012) for evidence from Germany). To be able 
to take this potential failure cause into account, we collected detailed data on daily 
temperatures and levels of important German rivers – covering most of the larger 
regions in the country – from the German Federal Waterways and Shipping Authority 
(WSV) supplied by the German Federal Institute for Hydrology (BfG). 
 We use the provided raw data to construct a German river level index.21 A dummy 
variable is derived that indicates whenever this index is below the 15 percent percentile 
of the data series. Furthermore, a second dummy variable indicates whenever the daily 
average temperature of one of the regarded rivers22 exceeds 23° Celsius.23 This has been 
the case on 23 days within our observation period. 
Generation of Renewable Energy 
According to existing regulations in the EEG (Erneuerbare Energie Gesetz: translated 
Renewable Energy Act), the feed-in of renewable energy is guaranteed and renewable 
generation receives fixed feed-in tariffs above their low marginal costs. As a 
consequence, whenever these units are producing energy, they are located at the very 
left of the merit order pushing all other power plants to the right. This decreases the 
                                                            
20  Additionally instrumenting for load does not change our main results significantly. For these 
estimations, we computed a temperature index and used this index and its square to instrument for 
load as the relationship between electricity prices and temperatures is typically U-shaped: low 
temperatures increase the demand for heating and high temperatures increase the demand for cooling. 
The respective regression tables are available from the authors upon request. 
21  Rivers considered for the level index are: Danube, Elbe, Main, Rhine and Spree. 
22  Rivers considered for the temperature dummy are: Danube, Elbe, Main and Rhine. 
23   A temperature of 23° Celsius is the legally envisaged value that, if exceeded, forces power plants to 
decrease electricity generation for environment protection purposes.  
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residual load – the part of load served by conventional technologies – and thus squeezes 
the market price (the so-called merit order effect of renewable energies).  
 Furthermore, there is also a likely relation between generation from fluctuating 
renewable energy sources and the risk of a failure for conventional power plants. The 
fluctuating nature of renewable energy sources such as wind and solar demands more 
challenging cycling activities from conventional plant types. As a consequence, the 
corresponding more frequent shutdowns, restarts and the generally more flexible mode 
of operation could lead to a larger number of forced sudden outages (e.g., due to acute 
repair needs) as soon as variation in renewable generation is high.24 We therefore 
include the generation from wind and solar as additional control variables into the 
model. The data – specifically the day-ahead forecasted generation of solar and wind 
generation – was downloaded from the EEX Transparency platform on a quarter hourly 
basis and converted into daily values.25 
4.1.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Based on the initial characterization of the variables included in our empirical analysis 
below, Table 1 provides the corresponding descriptive statistics including our two main 
failure type variables: non-strategic failures – the initially reported length of those 
failures that are announced more than one week prior to the beginning of the outage and 
last longer than one day – and strategic failures – the actual length of those failures that 
have been reported after the unit was unavailable (unannounced failures) and last at 
maximum one day. For illustration purposes we additionally report the descriptive 
statistics only for days were the unavailable capacity of a respective fuel type was above 
zero. As our failure data refers to the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 March 2014, we 
have added all further variables for the same observation period.  
  
 
  
                                                            
24  Already Lefton et al. (1995) argue that ‘forced outages are typically more frequent and of longer 
duration in cycling units than in baseload units’ (p. 197). As discussed in Kumar et al. (2012), cycling 
is likely to, first, increase the need for maintenance and to, second, decrease the expected lifetime of 
the respective plant as the essential plant components are stressed by changing pressures and 
temperatures whenever the unit is started, shut down or generally not operated at the load level it was 
constructed for.  
25   As prices for the day-ahead market are set one day before the delivery – and actual generation data 
arrives too late to the market to affect day-ahead prices – we included the planned generation of 
renewable energy in our data set. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean S.D. Min Max N 
Dependent Variable 
EPEX Spot Price (€) 36.93 11.24 -6.28 62.89 455 
Non-strategic failures (MW) – Zeros not included 
All Fuels  1477 881 100 4472 453 
Nuclear 873 572 119 1360 78 
Lignite 757 478 170 2081 275 
Hard Coal 616 519 100 2540 347 
Gas 432 262 100 1049 271 
Strategic Failures (MW) – Zeros not included 
All Fuels 407 297 100 1495 165 
Nuclear 419 388 120 1210 7 
Lignite 308 192 105 891 23 
Hard Coal 323 233 100 1114 94 
Gas 397 219 163 1001 20 
Non-strategic failures (MW) – Zeros included
All Fuels 1470 884 0 4472 455 
Nuclear 150 405 0 1360 455 
Lignite 457 525 0 2081 455 
Hard Coal 467 523 0 2540 455 
Gas 258 293 0 1049 455 
Strategic Failures (MW) – Zeros included 
All Fuels 148 265 0 1495 455 
Nuclear 6.44 68.23 0 1210 455 
Lignite 15.57 79.68 0 891 455 
Hard Coal 66.76 168 0 1114 455 
Gas 17.43 92.89 0 1001 455 
Control Variables  
Load (MWh) 62515 7788 43660 78813 455 
Wind (MWh) 1288 949 152 4927 455 
Solar (MWh) 829 579 38.84 2134 455 
River Level < 15% Percentile (binary) .15 .36 0 1 455 
River Temperature >23 °C (binary) .05 .22 0 1 455 
Instruments for Price 
Hard Coal Price 81.20 4.59 73.15 90.60 455 
Gas Price 26.46 2.24 20.83 39 455 
Carbon Emission Price 4.75 .89 2.72 7.11 455 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for all included variables from 1 January 2013 to the 31 
March 2014. Non-strategic failures refer to the unavailable megawatts per day that have been announced 
7 days or more before the beginning of the outage and are unavailable for at least one day. Strategic 
failures refer to the non-usable megawatts per day that have been reported after the beginning of the 
actual failure and are unavailable for less than 1 day. 
 
Although providing a detailed interpretation of the descriptive statistics of all variables 
shown in Table 1 appears dispensable, it is important to discuss the results for our 
failure variables in greater detail. As shown in Table 1, non-strategic failures take place 
virtually every day with approximately 1.5 GW capacity being unavailable on average. 
Failures that offer strategic potential are observed substantially less often. However, 
there are also large differences between the different fuel types. For example, for 
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nuclear power plants, we only find 78 days for which we observe failures without 
strategic potential. Situations in which nuclear plants could theoretically be subject to 
withholding strategies according to our definition of a strategic failure are even less 
likely and observed on only 7 days in our observation period. In other words, 150 MW 
of nuclear power without strategic potential is unavailable on an average day, however, 
only 6.44 MW with strategic potential. 
 While the situation looks similar for lignite, it is interesting to note that the fuels 
typically used as marginal units show substantially higher shares of strategic failures 
than the fuel types by which the baseload units are typically run. This is most obvious 
for hard coal which is the marginal technology most of the time and clearly posseses the 
highest potential to cause a substantial price rise by forcing a change of the marginal 
technology from hard coal to gas through the application of a withholding strategy.26 
Although this finding might also be influenced by the higher flexibility of the respective 
units – causing a larger amount of unannounced failures – strategic reasons might be 
another explanation of this general finding (justifying a detailed investigation as part of 
our empirical analysis below). 
4.2 Empirical Strategy and Estimation Results 
Guided by the existing theoretical literature and the general presence of all 
preconditions for a successful implementation of capacity withholding strategies, in this 
section, we first describe our empirical strategy to investigate the issue of strategic 
capacity withholding in the German-Austrian electricity market, followed by the 
discussion of our estimation results. In fact, building on our separation into non-
strategic failures and strategic failures introduced in Section 4.1.1 above, we are able to 
develop the following two main hypotheses. 
 Failures with a sufficiently long lead-time between announcement and failure – and a 
failure duration above one day – are defined as non-strategic failures. As these failures 
also include maintenance activities, the general aim to maximize profits suggest that 
these activities take place in low price periods leading to our first hypothesis.  
H1: For non-strategic failures, the market price is expected to have a negative impact 
on the occurrence of these failures.   
                                                            
26  However, also some types of gas-fueled plants might be able to generate a non-marginal price 
increase. 
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Spontaneous failures – again with limited failure duration of less than one day – are 
defined as strategic failures, i.e., they provide preconditions for profitable strategic 
capacity withholding. Strategic failures will take place when prices are high and current 
demand intersects at the sharply increasing right-hand part of the merit order leading to 
our second hypothesis.  
H2: For strategic failures, the market price is expected to have a positive impact on the 
occurrence of these failures, especially for the marginal technologies hard coal and 
gas. 
Our empirical approach is subdivided further into two separate approaches: our main 
parametric estimation approach comparable to Fogelberg and Lazarczyk (2014) and an 
additional semiparametric estimation approach as robustness check. 
Parametric estimation approach 
In implementing our main empirical approach, we apply – due to the above discussed 
simultaneity of failures and price – instrumental variable techniques (IV) and instrument 
for day-ahead prices through the gas price, the hard coal price and the carbon price. The 
reduced form estimation in the first stage regression has the following form: 
௧ܲ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߚ௧ᇱܼ௧ ൅ ߜଵ௧ᇱ ܴܧ௧ ൅ ߴଵܮ݋ܽ݀௧ ൅ ߠଵ௧ᇱ ܴ݅ݒ݁ݎ௧ ൅ ߮ଵ௧ᇱ ܥ݈ܽ௧ ൅ νଵ௧ (1)
Subscript t indicates the respective day, RE contains renewable energy generation from 
wind and solar, respectively. River contains river related variables: a dummy variable 
indicating low river levels and a dummy variable indicating river temperatures above 
23° Celsius. Load is daily average of the system load computed from hourly values. Cal 
is a vector of calendar variables, i.e. dummies for days of the week and months. Z 
contains the instruments for price – gas, hard coal and carbon emission right price. 
 In the second stage, our dependent variables are the power plant failures measured in 
MW per day and divided into failures containing the potential to strategically withhold 
capacity and those without such a potential (according to our definitions from above). 
Since our model is overidentified, we apply an IV GMM estimation approach 
implementing the following structural equation in the second stage:     
ܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁௧ ൌ 	ߙଶ ൅ ߚଶ ௧ܲ෡ ൅ ߜଶ௧ᇱ ܴܧ௧ ൅ ߴଶܮ݋ܽ݀௧ ൅ ߠଶ௧ᇱ ܴ݅ݒ݁ݎ௧ ൅ ߮ଶ௧ᇱ ܥ݈ܽ௧ ൅ νଶ௧ (2)
To account for the fact that the unavailable capacity can basically be considered as 
count data we also apply an IV Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood specification 
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(PPML).27 While we use logarithms of the failures variables for the IV GMM 
specification (zeros replaced by zeros) we use failure levels in the case of IV Poisson to 
allow a comparison of the respective coefficients as semi-elasticities. Thus, we also 
estimate the following Poisson model: 
ܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁௧ ൌ exp൫	ߙଷ ൅ ߚଷ ௧ܲ෡ ൅ ߜଷ௧ᇱ ܴܧ௧ ൅ ߴଷܮ݋ܽ݀௧ ൅ ߠଷ௧ᇱ ܴ݅ݒ݁ݎ௧ ൅ ߮ଷ௧ᇱ ܥ݈ܽ௧൯ ൅ νଷ௧ (3) 
The respective regression results are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. Our instruments 
are sufficiently strong as the stage F-statistic clearly exceeds the critical values by Stock 
and Yogo (2005). The validity of the instruments is also confirmed by the Hansen J 
statistic as we cannot reject the null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with 
the error term. As we also have to deal with serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, we 
use Newey-White standard errors for the IV GMM and Huber-White standard errors 
clustered by weeks for the IV Poisson specification. 
 In general, our estimation results provide clear support for both of our hypotheses. In 
the non-strategic failures regressions in Table 2, we find significantly negative 
coefficients for price for all fuel types besides lignite which remains insignificant. As 
discussed above, the significantly negative impact for some fuels indicate that 
announced non-usabilities – such as, e.g., maintenance activities – are conducted in 
low-price periods. In any case, it appears unlikely that announced non-usabilities play a 
role in terms of capacity withholding strategies and our empirical results support this 
view.    
 Turning to the results for strategic failures, Table 3 shows – consistent with our 
hypothesis 2 derived above – a significant and positive price effect for hard coal 
suggesting strategic withholding activities in times of high prices for hard coal plants. 
As explained above, this result is in line with the presence of strategic capacity 
withholding strategies as hard coal represents the marginal technology in the German-
Austrian electricity market most of the time. Furthermore, we also find a significantly 
positive effect for gas plant failures in the Poisson specifications. This is most likely 
caused by CCGT plants rather than by gas turbines since the former is the marginal 
technology much more often than the latter. However, as the failure data set only 
provides information on the fuel type, we are unable to further differentiate between 
these two types of gas-fueled plants. 
                                                            
27  As shown by Silva & Tenreyro (2011), Poisson is well suited to analyze data with a substantial 
number of zeros (as relevant in our case due to the large number of days without failures for the 
different fuel types).  
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Table 2: Non-strategic Failures (Announced failures with lead-time <7 days and failure duration>1 day; as initially reported) 
 All Fuels Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal Gas 
 GMM Poisson GMM Poisson GMM Poisson GMM Poisson GMM Poisson 
Price -0.0654*** -0.0489*** -0.1337* -0.1651*** -0.0691 0.0287 -0.0128 -0.0550** -0.4096*** -0.0916** 
 (0.0147) (0.0131) (0.0708) (0.0521) (0.0773) (0.0347) (0.0390) (0.0232) (0.0401) (0.0453) 
           
Wind -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0010* -0.0016*** -0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0029*** -0.0006* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
           
Solar -0.0004*** -0.0003** -0.0017* -0.0012** 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0005** -0.0025*** -0.0006 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
           
Load 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0001 0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
           
Rivers: Low levels 0.3621*** 0.2639*** 0.3323 0.0568 0.7726** 0.3581** 0.9291 0.1803 0.4998 -0.2116 
 (0.1364) (0.0932) (0.3991) (0.8436) (0.3046) (0.1683) (0.5748) (0.1694) (0.6186) (0.4273) 
           
Rivers: High Temp. -0.0170 -0.0341 0.5189 1.6066*** 0.5393** 0.4068*** -3.2738*** -17.2466*** -1.7242*** -1.8081*** 
 (0.0940) (0.1155) (0.6691) (0.4798) (0.2284) (0.1356) (0.5848) (0.5696) (0.3932) (0.6602) 
           
Constant 6.9911*** 7.4979*** 0.9637 -14.1093*** 13.2264*** 9.3670*** 3.0567** 6.4173*** -1.4414 0.8187 
 (0.7808) (0.4644) (1.4335) (3.0323) (3.8044) (0.9594) (1.2864) (0.9798) (1.9031) (1.0927) 
First Stage F stat. 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 
Critical values (10%) 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
Hansen J stat. 0.79 - 0.28 - 0.19 - 0.97 - 0.23 - 
#Obs. 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Autocorrelation considered 
through Newey-West standard errors in GMM models and clustered monthly for Poisson models. Critical values are obtained from Stock and Yogo (2005). Hansen J stat for 
overidentifying restrictions has the null hypothesis that instruments are orthogonal to the error term. Dependent variables reflect non-usable megawatts per day. River 
variables are dummies reflecting extraordinary high water temperatures and low water levels. Price variable is the daily average spot prices at the European Power 
Exchange (EPEX); instruments for the first stage regression of price are hard coal price, gas price and carbon emission right price. Dummies for day of the week and months 
are included but not reported. All variables are on a daily basis. 
 
 23 
 
Table 3: Strategic Failures (Unannounced failures with lead time< 1 day; as actually observed) 
 All Fuels Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal Gas 
 GMM Poisson GMM Poisson GMM Poisson GMM Poisson GMM Poisson 
Price 0.0639* 0.1233*** 0.0139** 0.1053 -0.0277 -0.0789 0.0604*** 0.1502*** 0.0015 0.2016* 
 (0.0367) (0.0377) (0.0062) (0.1370) (0.0228) (0.0893) (0.0216) (0.0454) (0.0137) (0.1168) 
           
Wind 0.0006** 0.0009*** 0.0001* 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0005*** 0.0011*** -0.0000 0.0016* 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0009) 
           
Solar -0.0010* 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0021 -0.0000 0.0007 -0.0009** -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0013 
 (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0015) 
           
Load -0.0001* -0.0001*** -0.0000*** -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000* -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
           
Rivers: Low levels 0.2532 -0.2613 -0.0106 -11.7961*** 0.1539 0.0302 0.2492 -0.7201** -0.1598 -14.7621*** 
 (0.3104) (0.3618) (0.0405) (0.7939) (0.1701) (0.7290) (0.1862) (0.3639) (0.1213) (0.5916) 
           
Rivers: High Temp. 2.5286*** 0.9788*** -0.0042 -0.8728 0.0411 0.3494 1.9882*** 0.7694* -0.0116 -1.5280** 
 (0.5426) (0.3477) (0.0329) (0.7016) (0.2263) (0.8554) (0.5354) (0.4090) (0.0474) (0.6394) 
           
Constant 1.4432 3.4478*** 0.2384 -14.4748*** -0.2841 -13.3994*** -0.0432 1.7754 -0.4585 -2.1290 
 (2.1099) (0.9263) (0.2143) (4.0478) (0.7607) (3.9561) (1.0663) (1.4030) (0.4174) (3.1133) 
First Stage F stat. 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 66.49 
Critical values (10%) 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
Hansen J stat. 0.84 - 0.18 - 0.20 - 0.92 - 0.33 - 
#Obs. 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticit and autocorrelationy. Autocorrelation considered 
through Newey-West standard errors in GMM models and clustered monthly for Poisson models. Critical values are obtained from Stock and Yogo (2005). Hansen J stat for 
overidentifying restrictions has the null hypothesis that instruments are orthogonal to the error term. Dependent variables reflect non-usable megawatts per day. River 
variables are dummies reflecting extraordinary high water temperatures and low water levels. Price variable is the daily average spot prices at the European Power 
Exchange (EPEX); instruments for the first stage regression of price are hard coal price, gas price and carbon emission right prices. Dummies for day of the week and 
months are included but not reported. All variables are on a daily basis.  
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Semiparametric estimation approach 
We now investigate the robustness of our previous findings against a non-linear specification of the 
price impact on failures. We therefore estimate a semiparametric partially linear regression model 
with Robinson’s (1988) double residual method. Consider a partially linear regression model of the 
type 
ܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ܺߠ ൅ ݂ሺܲሻ ൅ ߝ                                                                                                 (4) 
where X is the row vector of control variables, and ߠ଴ is the intercept term. Variable P represents 
price and enters the equation non-linearly according to a non-binding function f. ߝ	 is the 
disturbance, assumed to have ܧሺߝ|ܲሻ ൌ 0, an assumption which we will later relax. The double 
residual methodology applies conditional expectation on both sides leading to  
 ܧሺܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁|ܲሻ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ܧሺܺ|ܲሻߠ ൅ 	݂ሺܲሻ	                                                                                        (5) 
and through subtracting equation (5) from equation (4), we get  
ܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁ െ ܧሺܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁|ܲሻ ൌ ൫ܺ െ ܧሺܺ|ܲሻ൯ߠ ൅ ߝ	                                                                           (6) 
where ܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁ െ ܧሺܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁|ܲሻ ൌ ߝଵ and ܺ െ ܧሺܺ|ܲሻ ൌ ߝଶ reflect the two residuals. In a two-step 
procedure we first obtain estimates of the conditional expectations	ܧ௡ሺܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁|ܲሻ and ܧ௡ሺܺ|ܲሻ 
from some non-parametric (kernel) estimations of the form ܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁ ൌ ݉ி௔௜௟௨௥௘ሺܲሻ ൅ ߝଵ and 
ܼ௞௜ ൌ ݉௑ೖሺܲሻ ൅ ߝଶ with k=1,..,K indexing the control variables entering the model parametrically. 
After inserting the estimated conditional expectations in equation (6), Robinson’s method enables 
us to estimate the parameter vector ߠ consistently without explicitly modelling ݂ሺPሻ	by a standard 
non-intercept OLS regression and we obtain ߠ෠ ൌ ሺߝଶ̂ᇱ ߝଶ̂ሻିଵሺߝଶ̂ᇱ ߝଵ̂ሻ. Finally, ݂ሺܲሻ is estimated by 
regressing ൫ܨ݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁ െ ܺߠ෠൯ on P non-parametrically.	
 The endogenous nature of the non-parametrically modelled variable	ܲ, however, yields 
ܧሺߝ|ܲሻ ് 0. As standard IV-techniques such as 2-SLS and IV GMM yield biased estimates for 
non-linear models, we apply a two-stage residual inclusion approach (2SRI) by plugging the 
residuals ߥଵ from the first-stage estimation of P from equation (1) as control function into the semi-
parametric regression model in equation (6) (see Blundell and Powell, 2004 and Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2009, respectively). The results from the semi-parametric regressions are illustrated in 
Figure 2 and Table 4 below. 
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Figure 2: Non-parametric Fit from Semiparametric Control Function Regression  
Notes: Illustration of non-linear relation between failures and price with the grey areas delineating the respective 95 
percent confidence intervals. Estimated by Robinsons’s (1989) semiparametric double residual method. Endogeneity 
considered through a two-stage residual inclusion approach with the residuals from the first stage estimation of price 
in equation (1) as control function for endogeneity. 
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Table 4: Semi-parametric Estimates of the Impact of Price on Failures 
 Non-strategic Failures  Strategic Failures 
 All Fuels Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal Gas  All Fuels Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal Gas 
Price Non-
parametric 
Non-
parametric 
Non-
parametric 
Non-
parametric 
Non-
parametric 
 Non-
parametric 
Non-
parametric 
Non-
parametric 
Non-
parametric 
Non-
parametric   
            
Wind -0.0005*** -0.0015** -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0026***  0.0008* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006* 0.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006)  (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
            
Solar -0.0005** -0.0020** 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0022***  -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0007)  (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
            
Load 0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0004***  -0.0001* -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
            
Rivers: Low levels 0.3577** 0.4726 0.3808 0.8407 0.3653  0.2489 0.0096 0.1535 0.2550 -0.1769 
 (0.1492) (0.7511) (0.4891) (0.7348) (0.7994)  (0.5548) (0.0886) (0.2760) (0.4829) (0.1550) 
            
Rivers: High Temp. -0.0287 0.9394 0.2476 -3.4122 -1.8574  2.5952*** -0.0072 0.0191 2.0526*** -0.0528 
 (0.2060) (1.2994) (0.5314) (2.1095) (1.4390)  (0.9295) (0.0993) (0.3691) (0.7674) (0.1519) 
            
Control Function 0.0411* 0.1151 -0.0188 0.0134 0.2928***  0.0118 0.0036 0.0094 0.0019 0.0083 
 (0.0239) (0.0901) (0.0835) (0.0561) (0.0824)  (0.0607) (0.0178) (0.0398) (0.0499) (0.0264) 
First Stage F stat. 16.08 16.08 16.08 16.08 16.08  16.08 16.08 16.08 16.08 16.08 
Critical values (10%) 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08  9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
#Obs. 455 455 455 455 455  455 455 455 455 455 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Block bootstrap S.E. on weekly blocks. Estimation by the Robinson (1988) double 
residual estimator with price modelled non-parametrically. Critical values are obtained from Stock and Yogo (2005). Price variable is the daily average spot prices at the 
European Power Exchange (EPEX). Endogeneity of price considered through a two-stage residual inclusion approach with the residuals from the reduced form estimation of 
Price (Equation 1) as control function; instruments for the first stage regression of price are hard coal price, gas price and carbon emission right price. Dependent variables reflect 
non-usable megawatts per day. River variables are dummies reflecting extraordinary high water temperatures and low water levels. Dummies for day of the week and months are 
included but not reported. All variables are on a daily basis.  
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Confirming our earlier results of the parametric estimation approach, we again find the negative 
relationship between non-strategic failures and price throughout all fuels besides lignite. For the 
strategic failures, the only fuel type showing a positive relationship is again hard coal allowing 
the final conclusion that our empirical analysis finds evidence consistent with the presence of 
capacity withholding strategies in the German-Austrian electricity market during our observation 
period from 1 January 2013 to 31 March 2014. 
5 Conclusion 
In the integrated German-Austrian electricity market, a substantial fraction of electricity is traded 
on the day-ahead auction market – the EPEX Spot – via uniform price auctions. An important 
general characteristic of such auctions is that all operators receive the same price (per unit of 
output) which is determined by the costs of the marginal plant that is just needed to satisfy 
demand.  
 In such an environment, the capacity withholding strategy makes use of the fact that the 
supply schedule typically is convex while demand is unresponsive to price signals in the short-
term. Hence, whenever demand is high, a small reduction in supply substantially increases the 
marginal price and the price all operators receive. By strategically removing a fraction of their 
operating capacity from the market (e.g., by pretending a sudden failure of a generation unit), 
multi-unit plant operators expect that the correspondingly higher prices realized for the remaining 
operating units offset the lost revenues from the (strategically) removed capacity and thus lead to 
a net increase in profits. 
 In this context, we have investigated whether prices in the German-Austrian electricity market 
are found to have a significant influence on the capacity that is non-usable on a specific day. 
Differentiating between announced ‘non-strategic’ and unannounced (spontaneous) ‘strategic’ 
failures and applying parametric as well as semiparametric estimation methods, we find evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis of the presence of strategic capacity withholding activities in the 
German-Austrian electricity market during our observation period from 1 January 2013 to 31 
March 2014. In particular, we consistently find a significantly positive influence of prices on 
non-usable megawatts of hard coal-fueled (and partly also gas-fueled) plants as marginal 
technologies for the case of strategic failures only. In contrast, we find a negative impact of price 
for non-strategic failures reflecting maintenance activities. 
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 Our empirical evidence raises the question after policy implications. As the possibility of 
capacity withholding is closely connected to the mechanics of the uniform price auction, an 
obvious suggestion would be to consider switching to an alternative market design such as pay-
as-bid-auctions. However, independent of an answer to the question whether the problem of 
capacity withholding would indeed be solved by such a switch (see, e.g., Cramton and Stoft, 
2007, Heim and Götz, 2013, or Kahn et al., 2001), the choice of a certain market design is 
certainly determined by a careful evaluation of a multitude of different factors with the 
possibilities for strategic capacity withholding being only one criterion.28  
 This raises the question how the likelihood of the occurrence of such strategies can be reduced 
within the currently implemented regime. In addition to a possible introduction of a system of 
price caps together with additional capacity payments or the promotion of demand side 
participation in order to increase demand elasticity, it appears particularly important for the 
responsible authorities to urge market participants to report more detailed information about 
power plant non-usabilities in order to ease and improve monitoring efforts. However, although 
such increased monitoring efforts might reduce the likelihood of capacity withholding strategies, 
the probability that an operator will eventually be fined for strategic capacity withholding under 
current competition laws in Germany and Europe is rather low – and only appears possible if 
different types of empirical evidence are complemented by clear written evidence that such 
behavior has actually (and willfully) been applied in the German-Austrian electricity market.  
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